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1 Introduction: The Third moment in Law
and Development Theory and the Emergence
of a New Critical Practice
David M. Trubek and Alvaro Santos
The study of the relationship between law and economic development goes
back at least to the nineteenth century. It is a question that attracted the
attention of classical thinkers like Marx and Weber. And there were some
early efforts to craft policy in this area; for example, under the Raj, some
English Utilitarians tried to put Jeremy Bentham’s ideas about law and eco-
nomic progress into practice in India. But it was only after World War II that
systematic and organized efforts to reform legal systems became part of the
practice of international development agencies.
Initially, development agencies turned to law as an instrument for state
policy aimed at generating economic growth. Starting in the 1980s, interest
in the role of law in economic development grew, but it was an interest in law
more as a framework for market activity than as an instrument of state power.
This book argues that, starting in the mid-1990s, development practitioners
approached law in a fundamentally new way – as a correction for market
failures and as a constitutive part of “development” itself. As a result, “the
rule of law” has become significant not only as a tool of development policy,
but as an objective for development policy in its own right.
This book charts the history of this growing interest in the legal field,
explores the shifting rationales behind development policy initiatives, and
explores in detail the newest – and most surprising – of these rationales. To
do that, we trace the history of a body of ideas about law and economic devel-
opment that have been employed not just by academics but also by develop-
ment practitioners responsible for allocating funds and designing projects.
In this introduction, we refer to that body of ideas as law and development
doctrine. Although this doctrine has academic roots in economic and legal
theory, it is a practical working tool of development agencies.
This is not a static body of thought. Views on the relationship between law
and development, and thus on the nature of legal assistance efforts, change
over time. As ideas change and practices evolve, older ideas are challenged
1
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2 David M. Trubek and Alvaro Santos
and a new vision crystallizes. As a result, there have been several different
versions of law and development doctrine since the 1950s. In this introduc-
tion, we use the term “Moment” to refer to a period in which law and devel-
opment doctrine has crystallized into an orthodoxy that is relatively com-
prehensive and widely accepted. While the authors in this collection employ
different terms to refer to such “Moments” of crystallization, all agree that
there have been three primary forms of orthodox law and development doc-
trine since World War II.
The first such Moment emerged during the 1950s and 1960s. Development
policy focused on the role of the state in managing the economy and trans-
forming traditional societies. Development practitioners assumed that law
could be used as a tool for economic management and a lever for social
change. Initially, these assumptions were largely tacit but eventually a body
of theory and doctrine emerged. First Moment doctrine stressed the impor-
tance of law as an instrument for effective state intervention in the economy.
It helped guide a small number of law reform projects in a few parts of the
world.
In the 1980s, however, law moved to the center of development policy mak-
ing and the scope of the reform effort expanded exponentially. This renewed
interest in law was heavily influenced by the emergence of neoliberal ideas
about development. Neoliberal thinkers stressed the primary role of markets
in economic growth. As development policymakers sought to transform com-
mand and dirigiste economies into market systems, and integrate developing
nations into the world economy, they began to see law as an important arena
for policy.
Like the previous period, this was not a turn to law in general, but to a
particular vision of law and its role in the economy. The particular vision of
this period, however, could hardly have been more distinct from that which
came before. Rather than an instrument for state policy, law was understood
as the foundation for market relations and as a limit on the state. Of course,
new laws would be needed to dismantle state controls. But, consistent with
the dominant economic theory that working markets were both necessary
and sufficient for growth, the primary role assigned to legal institutions was
one of a foundation for market relations.
Attention shifted from the establishment of an administrative state to the
core institutions of private law, the role of the judiciary in protecting business
against the intrusions of government, and the need to change local laws to
facilitate integration into the world economy. Not much attention was paid to
regulatory law. When it was, regulation was often presented as an unnecessary
intrusion on the market. Neoliberal law and development thought focused
primarily on the law of the market: relatively little concern was shown for
law as a guarantor of political and civil rights or as protector of the weak and
disadvantaged.
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This neoliberal turn led to the Second Moment in law and development
doctrine and to a remarkable expansion of the assistance effort. The first law
and development efforts were small in scale, involving a few projects mostly
in Africa and Latin America. The neoliberal era ushered in a massive increase
in the level of investment and the scale of projects. Investments by bilateral
and multilateral agencies as well as by private foundations reached into the
billions. “Law and development” became big business.
The results of the neoliberal Second Moment have been analyzed and cri-
tiqued from many points of view. In this book we recapitulate and expand on
some of these analyses. But the real focus of the volume is on the description,
analysis, and critique of the Third and current Moment. We argue that a major
shift in law and development doctrine is going on today. In the 1990s and the
early years of this century, changes have occurred in development economics,
assistance policy and practice, and legal thought. Neoliberal ideas have been
revised and additional elements added to the definition of development. In
this context, mainstream law and development doctrine has changed. This
change has influenced and been influenced by shifts in development policy
more generally.
This book had its origins in a consensus among the authors that emerged
during a conference on “Law and Economic Development: Critiques and
Beyond” held at Harvard Law School in 2003.1 All of us have been studying
the relationship between law and economic development, some for many
years. As we prepared for the 2003 event, we all realized that a significant shift
had occurred in this field during the 1990s. We gave the shift different names,
we offered somewhat different explanations for the changes, and we held
differing views about the possible relationship between changes in theory and
changes in practice. But we all saw that something important was taking place.
We thought this shift might presage the emergence of a new paradigm
and the inauguration of the Third Moment in Law and Development. Some
thought that a basic change had occurred; others were not sure that the
neoliberal era had really ended. Was there a new paradigm, or simply a chas-
tened form of neoliberalism? We decided to pool our efforts to better under-
stand this shift. The group met several times over the following year.2 This
volume is the result.
“LAW AND DEVELOPMENT” DOCTRINE AS THE NODE OF THREE
DISCIPLINARY FIELDS
“Law and development doctrine” orients and explains the current practices
of those who seek to change legal systems in the name of development,
1 The conference was sponsored by the Harvard Law School European Law Research Center.
2 The group met at the University of Wisconsin in October, 2003, and at Cornell University and
the University of Toronto in April, 2004.
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4 David M. Trubek and Alvaro Santos
however defined. This doctrine is more than a detailed blueprint and less
than a robust theory. Our thesis is that at any point in time, the doctrine
can best be understood if it is seen as the intersection of current ideas in
the spheres of economic theory, legal ideas, and the policies and practices of
development institutions.
These spheres are analytically separable but practically intertwined. They
influence each other in complex and reciprocal ways. Both the theory and
the practice of law and development are shaped by, and at the same time
shape, the spheres of economic theory, legal theory, and institutional prac-
tice. The book does not suggest a relation of causality between these various
spheres. Our goal is to disentangle the separate spheres, understand how
each has changed in recent years, study how they have interacted, and chart
the multiple dynamics of influence.
As the chart shows, law and development doctrine emerges from the inter-
section of economics, law, and institutional practice. Economics influences
the practices and policies of the development agencies but these policies and
practices may also be taken into account in shaping economic theory. So
there is an area of overlap between institutional practice and economic the-
ory. But the shape of this space is also constituted by the world of legal ideas:
when economic theory and institutional practice turn to law, they must take
their ideas about law from the realm of legal thought. Law and development
doctrine, then, crystallizes when all three of these sources come together.
The analysis of the spheres and their interaction in the following chapters
helps us chart recent changes and understand the emergence of a new vocab-
ulary and an increasingly dominant way of thinking about development. The
resulting maps are an effective guide for understanding and contesting cur-
rent mainstream thought and practice.
Our authors suggest many reasons why a new law and development main-
stream vision is emerging. These include changes within the field of devel-
opment economics, reactions to failures of the neoliberal Moment, changing
policies and practices of the World Bank and other development agencies,
developments within legal theory in the center, and the spread of a new legal
consciousness to the periphery.
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One of the recurring themes in this volume is the complex relationship
between changes in development economics and practices and changes at
any point in time in ideas about law’s role in development. All the authors
recognize the relationship between these bodies of ideas. They may not agree
on the exact nature of this relationship but all acknowledge that at given points
in time ideas from the several spheres seem to fit together and a new Moment
begins.
THE FIRST TWO MOMENTS IN LAW AND DEVELOPMENT
We can think of the First Moment as “Law and the Developmental State.” The
developmental state was based on a series of assumptions that included the
idea that import substitution in the internal market is the engine of growth;
scarce savings must be directed to key investment areas; the private sector is
too weak to provide “take-off” to self-sustaining growth; and “traditional sec-
tors” will resist change. Foreign capital may help but it is scarce and possibly
exploitative. As a result, in order to secure self-sustaining growth, the national
state should create plans, reallocate surplus, combat resistance, invest and
manage key sectors, and control foreign capital.
The primary use of law in the developmental state is as a tool to remove
“traditional” barriers and change economic behavior. Laws are needed to cre-
ate the formal structure for macroeconomic control. Legislation can translate
policy goals into action by channeling economic behavior in accordance with
national plans. The law is needed to create the framework for operation of
an efficient governmental bureaucracy and the governance of public sector
corporations. Legal rules are needed to manage complex exchange controls
and import regulations.
Law and development doctrine and practice in the First Moment followed
from this vision. The focus was on modernizing regulation and the legal pro-
fession. Emphasis was placed on public law and transplanting regulatory
laws from advanced states. It was important to strengthen the legal capacity
of state agencies and state corporations and modernize the legal profession
by encouraging pragmatic, policy-oriented lawyering. Because moderniza-
tion was thought to come about primarily through university training, a great
deal of emphasis was placed on the reform of legal education.
The Second Moment might be called “Law and the Neoliberal Market.”
The development policy of the neoliberal market was based on the view that
the best way to achieve growth was by getting prices right, promoting fiscal
discipline, removing distortions created by state intervention, promoting free
trade, and encouraging foreign investment.
The vision of law in the Second Moment was as an instrument to foster
private transactions. In the Second Moment, law and development doctrine
placed its emphasis on private law in order to protect property and facilitate
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contractual exchange. It sought to use the law to place strict limits on state
intervention and ensure equal treatment for foreign capital.
Second Moment legal reforms were designed to strengthen the rights of
property and ensure that contracts would be enforceable. Emphasis was
placed on the role of the judiciary both as a way to restrain the state and
to facilitate markets. It was thought that an independent judiciary using for-
malistic methods would provide fidelity to the law and predictability. The
model was thought to be universal: markets were markets, and the same
legal foundations would be needed and could operate anywhere.
THE TRANSITION TO THE PRESENT: THE CRITIQUE OF
NEOLIBERALISM AND THE EMERGENCE OF NEW PRINCIPLES
FOR DEVELOPMENT POLICY
As the last century came to an end, reactions to the neoliberal program
in development economics grew stronger. Many developing and transition
countries that had adopted these policies experienced severe economic
crises. When it became clear that neoliberal policies were not delivering the
growth that had been promised, the voices of skeptical economists became
louder, and confidence in the so-called Washington Consensus that codified
neoliberal policies began to erode.
The devastating experience with market-shock therapy in Russia, the severe
economic emergency experienced by a number of Latin American countries,
and the Asian financial crisis made clear that markets do not create the con-
ditions for their own success. People recognized that unrestricted markets
were often inefficient and that state intervention was necessary to correct
such market failures as transaction costs or information asymmetries. Crit-
ics charged neoliberal policymakers for not having paid attention to existing
local institutions and to timing of reforms. They noted that transplanted laws,
thought to reflect best practices, often did not take hold, or produced results
diametrically opposite from what was intended. They emphasized that suc-
cess of economic policies could not be disentangled from local context and
from concern with sequencing and pacing of reforms.
Another set of critiques questioned the exclusive focus on economic growth
that had dominated development thinking. One set of critics noted that
growth did not necessarily lead to poverty reduction. Others questioned the
very idea that “development” should be seen exclusively as a matter of eco-
nomic growth and poverty alleviation.
These critiques have led to two distinct lines of new ideas about devel-
opment: the recognition of the limits of markets and the expansion of the
definition of development. Mainstream development thinkers continue to
stress the importance of markets as the main mechanism for production and
distribution of resources in societies and as the main leverage for economic
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growth. But they now also recognize that there may be significant market
failures, which could justify state intervention. Development economists no
longer insist on “deregulation” of internal markets, but rather focus on intro-
ducing “appropriate regulation.” Similarly, they have come to qualify their
faith in open international borders and unrestricted flows of capital and
goods. While the faith in free trade is still robust, it has been qualified by
recognition that countries need to pace the liberalization of their borders.
Second, there is an appeal for a reconceptualization of development that
would decenter the focus on economic growth. Advocates of this view argue
that development policies should broaden their scope in the pursuit of human
development, of which income is only an aspect, and equal consideration
should be paid to political, social, and legal development. Taken together,
these multiple aspects of development aim at promoting development as
freedom: the goal is to enhance people’s capabilities and to enable individuals
to lead the life they choose to live. These objectives have been captured in
the promotion of a “Comprehensive Development Framework” and in the
incorporation of a social agenda in policy recommendations.
In addition to these two major efforts to rethink development, other
changes occurred as academics and practitioners reflected on the limits of
the neoliberal model. Thus, more stress is being put on the need to consider
local institutions and to avoid one size fits all approaches. Also, there is more
attention to local participation in the design and implementation of eco-
nomic reforms so that local groups take “ownership” of reforms and projects.
Finally, there has been a renewed interest in establishing social safety nets
and focusing policy more explicitly on poverty reduction.
The new attention to the limits of markets, the effort to define development
as freedom not just growth, the stress on the local, the interest in participa-
tion, and the focus on poverty reduction have helped set in motion new think-
ing about law and have ushered in a new Moment in law and development
doctrine.
THE THIRD MOMENT IN LAW AND DEVELOPMENT THEORY: AN
EMERGING PARADIGM?
As the critique of neoliberal policies took shape and new visions of develop-
ment policy emerged, people interested in the role of law started to rethink
Law and Development doctrine. As a result, a new set of ideas about law have
appeared and gained support, allowing us to speak of a Third Moment in
Law and Development. Unlike the first two, however, this Moment is still in a
formative phase. While the basic outlines of a new vision have become clear,
some aspects are still contested.
This new “paradigm” contains a mix of different ideas for development
policy. These include the idea that markets can fail and compensatory
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intervention is necessary, as well as the idea that “development” means more
than economic growth and must be redefined to include “human freedom.”
While Third Moment doctrine embraces these broad notions, each encom-
passes a great range of options with very different implications for policy. Take
“market failure” as a rationale for intervention. This can be construed very
broadly, allowing wide scope for government intervention, or very narrowly.
Similarly, while everyone is committed to including human rights in devel-
opment, there is room for very different interpretations of what that might
mean. For some, human rights might mean limiting state action while oth-
ers might deploy a more expansive notion. The same terminology of human
rights can be used to promote the interests of oppressed minorities and hold-
ers of property.
These two key ideas are not only subject to very different interpretations;
they may also be deployed in ways that make them incompatible. A vision
of development that embraces human flourishing as its benchmark certainly
goes beyond a purely economic conception of development. Those pursuing
a holistic vision of development may choose policies that sacrifice long-term
growth results to avoid a decrease in or promote an increase of people’s capa-
bilities and freedom. In contrast, those supporting a wealth maximization
yardstick for development may opt for policies having a prospect for long-
term growth results at the expense of investing in people’s capabilities.
Another feature that marks the Third Moment as more unsettled than the
prior two periods of orthodoxy is the simultaneous presence of critique. At
the same time that these new conceptions of development are taking root,
a new set of critiques is also being developed. The critiques, including those
presented in this book, include some of the concerns raised during the Second
Moment. But the new critique adds elements unique to the present because
it looks closely at the new elements of doctrine that have appeared in this
Third Moment.
In addition to delineating the Third Moment vision, the authors in this book
articulate a critique of this emerging orthodoxy. They use different terminolo-
gies but all agree that a new form of development doctrine is emerging.3 They
see that the new doctrine accepts the use of law not only to create and protect
markets, but also to curb market excess, support the social, and provide direct
relief to the poor. They believe that while Third Moment doctrine continues
the neoliberal project of private law development, the new vision also seeks
to construct an appropriate framework for regulation of economic behavior.
3 All but one of the chapters focus on the description and analysis of the Third Moment although
many do this in the light of a history of earlier periods. They give different names to, and dif-
ferent accounts of, the new orthodoxy and take different approaches to the emerging critique.
For example, in describing mainstream theory David Kennedy refers to “chastened neolib-
eralism” while Trubek calls it “Rule of Law II,” Rittich talks about the “incorporation of the
social,” Newton speaks of the “post Moment,” and Santos identifies it with the World Bank’s
Comprehensive Development Framework.
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The authors note that the judiciary remains a central actor and judicial
reform still is a major focus of development assistance. But they see that
there are subtle differences in the role ascribed to judges in Third Moment
doctrine. Now judges not only have to protect property rights and be sure
contracts are enforced; they also have to be sure they interpret regulatory law
correctly, protect a wider range of human rights, and contribute to poverty
reduction. As a result, they cannot rely exclusively on formalist reasoning but
must also deploy consequentialist thought. And since the judiciary is now
linked to poverty reduction and the social, it is important to provide access
to justice for those most in need.
Finally, there is some recognition that one size does not fit all. As the agen-
cies gain more experience and the tasks ascribed to law become more com-
plex, they at least say they are willing to accommodate local conditions and
national diversities.
Legal ideas: The Third Moment and the history of legal thought
The progress from the First to the Third Moment in law and development not
only moves law to the center of development policy making; it also changes
the rationale for legal development assistance. Up to now, the rationale for
such assistance has been instrumental. Proponents argued that in one way
or another law was a tool to bring about development, and development
meant economic growth. But in the current era, the concept of development
has been expanded to include law reform as an end in itself. Third Moment
development thinkers have not rejected instrumental arguments; they still
think that law is important to constitute markets and implement a host of
policies. But they also see legal institutions as part of what is meant by devel-
opment, so that legal reform is now justified whether or not it can be tied
directly to growth.
To understand the current Moment in thinking about “law and develop-
ment,” we must first look at developments within the sphere of legal theory.
And to do that, we must first go back a long way in time. That is the role of
Duncan Kennedy’s chapter on the globalization of legal consciousness.
Kennedy’s chapter provides a sweeping history of law and legal thought
from the mid-nineteenth century to the present. He shows how several times
in that period a dominant set of ideas about law and its relation to economy
and society emerged and was gradually diffused around the world. He iden-
tifies three such sets of ideas or “globalizations”: the first one going approxi-
mately from 1850 to 1914, the second from 1900 to 1968, and the third from
1945 to 2000.
The first of these modes or globalizations is classical legal thought, which
consolidates nineteenth-century liberal ideas about law in a market society. It
stresses the importance of individual autonomy and sees the primary role of
law being protection of property and free transactions. Classical legal thought
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embraces legal formalism – the deduction of legal results within a coherent
and autonomous legal order.
The second globalization was based on the idea of law as means to an
end, an instrument to pursue social goals. In this mode, social law emerges to
supplement market relations. Laws are consciously designed to achieve social
ends. To pursue social welfare, law’s domain expands into areas previously
left to the market or the will of the parties. Because law is a means to achieve
such ends, legal thought must embrace consequentialist analysis.
Duncan Kennedy’s analysis helps us understand the past of law and devel-
opment doctrine. The First Moment in Law and Development embraced the
core ideas of social law and consequentialism while the Second or neoliberal
Moment was an effort to revive the free market ideas of classical legal thought.
But it also helps illuminate the present. For in his chapter Duncan Kennedy
sketches a third mode of legal reasoning. He describes this third mode as an
amalgam of the prior modes of legal consciousness, which incorporates two
separate elements: policy analysis and public law neoformalism.
Policy analysis involves balancing the competing considerations and con-
flicting interests present in complex legal problems and finding a supposedly
rational solution. In this mode, judges are expected to make decisions by
assessing consequential outcomes out of conflicting considerations. Neo-
formalism, on the other hand, involves purportedly deductive reasoning by
reference to rights and principles in foundational texts like treaties and con-
stitutions. Policy analysis draws from ideas of the second globalization of legal
thought while new formalism relies on ideas developed in the initial one.
This mode of legal thought emerged after World War II and has gradually dif-
fused around the world. Many factors may account for this diffusion: Duncan
Kennedy lists a number of them, including the spread of constitutional courts,
the role of transnational law firms and transnational legal NGOs, the incorpo-
ration of this mode of thought in the work of international organizations, the
global reach of U.S. courts, and the emergence of a transnational legal elite.
The rise of this mode of thought is a key element in the emergence of the
Third Moment. Because this mode of consciousness includes attention to the
social and to consequentialism, it served as one foundation for the critique
of the neoliberal revival of classical legal thought and as a building block for
a new form of doctrine. As it was widely diffused already, it provided cultural
support for legal projects built around Third Moment premises.
Economic ideas
The current Moment is to a great extent the result of the acknowledged failures
of neoliberalism. Of course, voices on the left have pointed to the limits of
neoliberalism from the very beginning. But voices from within the original
mainstream have been far more influential in defining the current Moment.
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As the neoliberal Moment played itself out, even those who believe that the
market is the only way to allocate resources for growth came to recognize that
markets do not create themselves, may sometimes fail, and cannot deal with
all issues of concern to developing countries.
When institutional economists began to posit the need for state inter-
vention to create institutional infrastructure, and people like Joseph Stiglitz
reminded everyone that markets have inherent imperfections, there emerged
within development economics itself the recognition that law might be
needed to create the necessary infrastructure for markets, regulate activ-
ity when markets fail, and provide for social needs that markets could not
meet. An even broader role for law emerged from the views of economists
like Amartya Sen who argued that law, democracy, and freedom should be
included in the very definition of development.
For David Kennedy, thanks to changes in development theory and legal
theory, a new law and development mainstream has emerged. This new main-
stream includes the basic neoliberal ideas concerning the importance of law
for the operation of private markets. But it also has room for a limited form
of state intervention in markets as well as for protection of human rights.
The new mainstream rejects the strong neoliberal presumption against reg-
ulatory law and accepts the need for legal intervention to reduce transaction
costs and compensate for market failures.
David Kennedy observes that whereas neoliberals thought that the market
required a highly formalist approach to the judicial role, the new mainstream
accepts the importance of consequentialist thought in the law of the mar-
ket. But while instrumental or consequentialist policy analysis is central to
mainstream law and development theory in the Third Moment, it is only one
part of a complex amalgam. It may seem strange that the new mainstream
can embrace instrumental legal thought for the law of the market but rely on
formalism for the interpretation of treaties, constitutions, and similar fun-
damental texts. This amalgam can be seen as related both to the disillusion
with extensive state intervention in the economy and the spread of consti-
tutionalism and judicial review around the world. Kennedy’s chapter argues
that it is just this form of legal consciousness that has been embraced by the
development policy mainstream.
A distinctive aspect of the new development theory mainstream could be
called, following Rittich, the “incorporation of the social.” With the introduc-
tion of the World Bank’s Comprehensive Development Framework (CDF), the
leading development assistance institution has proclaimed the need to pay
greater attention to social, structural, and human dimensions of develop-
ment. This has meant more concern for human rights, gender equity, direct
poverty alleviation, democracy, and access to justice.
The move to the social reinforces the importance of the judge in the cur-
rent Moment and helps explain the importance given to the judiciary in
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today’s development assistance practices. We can call it social, because it
deemphasizes the economic side of the development equation – and empha-
sizes the social and human side of the process. It appeals to a “holistic” or
integral definition of development in which each of the constitutive dimen-
sions of development (economic, social, political, and legal) is in a relation of
interdependence. On the instrumental or policy-analysis side, policies have
to be attuned to the local conditions of the market and its existing insti-
tutional forms. Judges are expected to make decisions by assessing con-
sequential outcomes and balancing competing considerations in light of
the local context. There is an emphasis on consensus building, on increas-
ing participation of all stakeholders to reach agreement and thus owner-
ship of the projects. On the other hand, there is a clear rights analysis,
“neoformalist” component associated with CDF that has made “freedom”
the paramount consideration of development. In other words, the CDF has
enhanced both the instrumental and the rights-analysis aspects of the third
globalization.
Institutional practices
The changes in economic and legal ideas affected, and were affected by,
changes in the rhetoric and sometimes in the practices of the development
agencies. Accused by critics of not doing enough to create the conditions for
markets, placing too much faith in markets as development mechanisms,
ignoring issues of equality, being insensitive to the needs of women, and not
doing enough to promote democracy, development agencies began to rede-
fine what they meant by development and increase their investment in law
reform projects.
Take the issue of judicial reform, for example. Judicial reform has been a
central feature of legal development assistance for a long time. As Santos
explains, however, the World Bank’s rationale for its judicial projects has
shifted over time. Initially, interest in judicial reform was justified almost
exclusively by the need to create basic institutions for securing private enti-
tlements, facilitating transactions, and limiting state intervention in mar-
kets. This helps explain why neoliberal theory and legal development prac-
tice stressed the importance of formalism in the private law of the market.
Formalism seemed like a method to both increase the predictability of judi-
cial action and to constrain any judicial temptation to interfere in market
relations.
This has changed with the recognition that limited interventionism may be
needed to avoid market failures. Once it became clear that some degree of reg-
ulation would be needed, it became obvious that judges would have to employ
consequentialist thought to ensure fulfillment of regulatory objectives. That
helps explain the reemergence of policy analysis in law and development
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thinking. A similar change in policy and perhaps in the practice of judicial
reform is related to the introduction of the social. The World Bank has con-
tinued to support judicial efficiency among the objectives of judicial reform
projects. But as Rittich and Santos show, with the appearance of the CDF, it
has also begun to focus on “access to justice” and has supported direct efforts
to empower advocates for the poor and other “unrepresented interests.”
The integration of the spheres
Taken together, developments in these distinctive spheres help explain why
the legal consciousness of the Third Moment embraces both the market and
the social and deploys formalism and consequentialism. The Third Moment
in law and development doctrine began to take shape when the limits of the
revival of classical thought and formalism that marked the Second Moment
became apparent. Once mainstream thinkers saw that state intervention was
needed to maintain and supplement markets and started paying more atten-
tion to social concerns it became clear that the pure neoliberal model of
law was inadequate. But at the same time it seemed important to preserve
some of the elements of classical formalism as a protection against abuse of
state and judicial powers. What was needed was a way of thinking that would
allow intervention, albeit a limited one, and would permit the use of law
as an instrument of economic transformation without trampling on funda-
mental rights. Law and development thinkers had this mode of legal thought
handy in the amalgam Duncan Kennedy describes as the Third Globalization
that had already diffused in many parts of the world. By incorporating policy
analysis and public law formalism into law and development doctrine, pol-
icy makers were able to link development assistance projects and lend their
institutional support to these increasingly influential ideas.
THE NEW CRITICAL PRACTICE
A distinctive feature of the Third Moment in law and development thought
is the emergence of a new critical practice. The critique of law and devel-
opment orthodoxy has a long history, dating back to Trubek and Galanter’s
“Scholars in Self-Estrangement,”4 which challenged much of the theory and
practice of the First Moment. Today’s critical practice started as a reaction
against the neoliberal Moment. It included a critique of such elements as
neoformalism in the law of markets, the strong antiregulatory presumption,
simple-minded legal transplantation, subordination of issues of equity and
social development to the overarching goal of rapid economic growth, and
4 David M. Trubek and Marc Galanter, Scholars in Self-Estrangement: Reflections on the Crisis in
Law and Development Studies in the United States, 1974 Wis. L. Rev. 1062 (1974).
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the costs involved in rapid integration of developing nations into an open
global economy.
But the emergence of the new mainstream in the Third Moment, with its
subtle softening of neoliberal orthodoxy, introduction of constitutionalism
and human rights, and apparent reintroduction of the social, presents a
more complex challenge. To deal with the emerging new mainstream we
must not only account for the most recent changes, but also develop a crit-
ical analysis of a more complex situation. This volume seeks to meet those
challenges.
In addition to describing the emergence of a new form of mainstream
theory about the role of law in development, our authors seek to launch a
new critical practice. This practice builds on and incorporates earlier critical
approaches but goes beyond them to confront the rhetoric and practices of
the Third Moment.
Antecedents and foundations
Not all of the “new” critical practice is new. Indeed, many of its guiding ideas
have their origins in critiques developed in the previous law and development
Moments. This should be no surprise as many of the issues that earlier critics
raised are still with us. Mainstream thought may have changed, but many
of its assumptions haven’t changed completely. And even where there seem
to be new theories animating development policy, it is far from clear that
development practice follows the new rhetoric.
The politics of private law
Drawing on the tradition of American legal realism, our authors challenge
commonly held assumptions about private law. They question the economic
neutrality of the private law regime of property and contract, the distinc-
tion between public and private law, and the related idea that judges do not
make law.
Much current development thought continues to present private law as a
neutral framework in which economic actors establish relations in a realm
of freedom. This is contrasted with the sphere of public or “regulatory” law,
which is presented as coercive, and an “intervention” in an otherwise level
playing field. Moreover, in this vision, the judges who decide cases involving
private law issues are represented not as making regulatory or distributional
decisions; they are simply deriving results from abstract principles.
Our authors challenge this body of thought, which has played a major role
in the Second Moment and has a continued presence in some circles today.
They reject the public/private distinction on which it is based, making clear
that the background rules of property and contract, constructed by judicial
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decisions, are just as coercive and interventionist as public regulatory law.
They show that these background norms structure behavioral incentives and
play a key role in the distribution of economic resources and power in society.
They also show that the idea that judges do not make law, but just use
deductive techniques to discover preordained conclusions, is pure myth.
They emphasize that law is not a closed, coherent, and consistent conceptual
system with potential answers to all legal questions and factual situations,
but rather is ridden with gaps, conflicts, and ambiguities that need to be
resolved by judges or other decisionmakers when interpreting and applying
the law. They remind us of the enormous discretion of judges and of their role
as lawmakers, establishing policies with distributional stakes.
Unreconstructed market fundamentalism
All of our authors suggest that despite rhetorical change, the development
assistance world still places primary faith in markets. Despite the rhetoric
of the social, World Bank legal projects still focus primarily on creating the
conditions for market activity. And while there is now a recognition that mar-
ket failure may justify limited state intervention, it seems that the assistance
agencies have a very narrow definition of market failure and thus relatively
little tolerance for a more active participation of the state in the economy.
Further, as Santos has documented, development agencies like the World
Bank are not monoliths, and even if some units are committed to change,
others, possibly more powerful, may stick to the core ideas of the neoliberal
Moment.
The gap between rhetoric and reality
A recurring theme in the analysis of the Third Moment is the extent to which
development practice follows changes in law and development theory. Sev-
eral of our authors question whether the changes that we have observed
reflect deep changes in policy and practice, or whether they really are little
more than a smokescreen to deflect critics.
Containment
Several of the chapters suggest that even when doctrine has actually changed,
the new policies may severely restrict the scope of any change. Take, for
example, the recognition that law may be needed to correct market failure.
This may seem like a significant expansion of the neoliberal model, but if
market failure is defined very narrowly this doctrinal shift may leave much of
the original model unchanged. Similarly, as Rittich argues, the “incorporation
of the social” may add something but it also allows development agencies to
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control what is meant by the social and define it in ways fully compatible
with the core strategy. Thus, the critics suggest that the Third Moment may
involve some real change, but only enough to contain critics of the neoliberal
mainstream.
The continuing vitality of the critique of formalism
A major feature of prior critical practices was the critique of formalism. This
critique has a long and distinguished pedigree in legal thought. For much of
the twentieth century, legal scholars have pointed out that formalist objec-
tives were unrealizable and formalist ideology masked judicial discretion.
This critique was applied to critique of the reliance of formalism in the neolib-
eral law of the market. To the extent that continued market fundamentalism
keeps those ideas alive, the critique remains valid. Further, although Third
Moment legal thinkers have introduced an element of consequentialism into
their revised law of the market, they have added public law neoformalism to
the law and development amalgam thus creating a new target for this type of
critique.
The critique of efficiency
During the neoliberal Moment, legal reforms in a wide array of areas were
justified on grounds of economic efficiency. The new critical practice incor-
porates both an internal and external critique of efficiency claims. First, the
internal critique emphasizes that efficiency analysis does not deliver deter-
minate solutions for the choice of particular rules. Rather, there are a number
of possible efficient solutions with different distributional consequences. So,
efficiency analysis does not offer an escape from the need of making choices
when making law. Nor does it justify any a priori preference for private legal
ordering over regulatory intervention. Second, the external critique chal-
lenges the self-proclaimed scientificity of efficiency analysis and its appeal to
neutrality, showing that this type of reasoning is logically fallible and politi-
cally contestable. In the end, there is no reason for thinking that a one-time
efficiency gain will be translated into “development” rather than another sta-
ble, low level, equilibrium.
The forgotten issue of distribution
A very central objective of our effort has been to reinstate distributional
issues on the development agenda. Critics in this volume have challenged
two features of Third Moment thought. The first, inherited from the neolib-
eral Moment, is the idea that a mature system of private law creates a level
playing field. The myth of the distributional neutrality of the private law order
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was exposed by the Legal Realists decades ago and continues to be a major
point of critique in the present Moment.
This effort to demonstrate that private law as well as regulatory interven-
tions has distributional consequences merges with the critique of neoliberal
tendencies to efface distributional questions in development doctrine more
generally. As both Newton and David Kennedy point out, where all earlier
theories of economic development assumed that distributional issues were
fundamental to an effective growth strategy, market fundamentalists focus
exclusively on the role of allocative efficiency through markets to promote
growth.
Finally, the critics note that the redefinition of law reform as an end of
development in its own right further obscures the issue of distribution. Even
if instrumental rationales for legal reform downplay distributional conse-
quences, at least they make claims about the relationship between these
changes and growth that can be met by distributional analysis. But, if law
reform is an end in itself, the whole issue seems to go away.
False universalism
Another feature of the new critical practice is the challenge it poses to the
idea that there is one model of development and thus one model for law
in development. At the height of the neoliberal Moment, Margaret Thatcher
issued her famous dictum that “there is no alternative” and the develop-
ment agencies of that time adopted the so-called “Washington Consensus,”
which preached market fundamentalism and economic integration as the
solution for all countries. In the legal sphere, this view led to what Newton
calls “prescriptive transplantism” in which Western legal models are imposed
on transitional and developing countries.
Although Third Moment development thinking has expanded to include
issues of democracy and the social, and to recognize the need for limited
interventionism, the development agencies still are largely committed to the
idea that there is one basic model that should be followed by all developing
and transition countries. While revisionist mainstream thinkers accept the
need for limited differences and sequencing of reforms, the critics seek to
challenge the continued adherence to a basic universalism and suggest the
possibility of alternative development paths and legal models.
The hegemony of the world economic order
The new critical practice questions the relationship between the legal sys-
tems of developing and transition countries and the hegemony of the world
economic order. Although the focus of critical practice is on the policies of
the development agencies, critics recognize that their actions are only one of
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many international forces that affect the legal orders of developing and tran-
sition economies. These legal orders are affected by trade regimes like the
World Trade Organization (WTO) and North American Free Trade Agreement
(NAFTA), by the role played by transnational legal actors, by cultural flows,
and other factors. To the extent that these forces constrain alternatives to a
one-size-fits-all model of capitalism, critics seek to expose their impact and
question their necessity.
The possibility of contestation
Fundamental to the critical practice is the desire to open things up for chal-
lenge and contestation. Contributors to this volume believe that more equi-
table and fairer approaches to development are possible. They think that legal
rules, practice, culture, and consciousness are arenas in which false univer-
salism and appeal to professional expertise can be contested and alternatives
proposed. They all hope that this volume will encourage such contestation.
CONCLUSION
The current literature reveals several very different approaches to law and
development that contrast with the argument of this volume. The first are the
“chastened neoliberals” who think that minor adjustments in the neoliberal
model, plus better implementation of reforms, are all that is needed. Included
in that group are those who see the problems as largely technical, simply
requiring better indicators and more empirical studies to perfect the model.
The second are those who think that all that we need is a turn to a holistic view
of development to fully implement the move to the social and the embrace
of policy analysis and public law formalism. In contrast, these essays suggest
that the practice of law and development must pay close attention to issues
of distribution, question the alleged neutrality of both policy analysis and
public law formalism, and explore alternative models of development and
the role law might play in advancing them.
